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Executive Summary 
This paper provides a snapshot of current protectionist dynamics making extensive use of the 
GTA database. Two methods of estimating the trade covered by crisis-era protectionism are also 
examined. Although the method used in recent WTO report may use a more appropriate level of 
tariff  line  disaggregation  for  some  discriminatory  measures,  overall,  it  is  argued  that  GTA's 
estimates  provide  a  better  estimate  of  the  amount  of  global  commerce  affected  by  global  era 
protectionism.  
 
This  paper  also  confirms  the  contemporary  importance  of  “murky”  protectionism.  The 
overview of the crisis-era protectionist landscape shows that in each quarter of the past 18 months 
more than half of discriminatory measures are not tariffs or trade defense measures and tend to fall 
under weaker or no WTO rules. The harm inflicted by and the discrimination against the Asia-
Pacific region is rather similar to global tendencies; although tariff-related measures are slightly 
more  prevalent  in  this  region.  For  the  jurisdiction  harmed  by  the  greatest  number  of  foreign 
discriminatory measures, China, it is shown that at least 10 percent of its exports are harmed and 
more  than  50  percent  of  which  are  affected  by  “murky”  forms  of  protectionism,  notably,  local 
content requirements and bailouts.  
 
In  interpreting  the  performance  of  WTO  rules,  the  evidence  presented  raises  further 
questions. Some heart might be taken from the fact that governments have not chosen to raise tariffs 
above bound rates. However, the widespread resort to subsidies and bail outs raises concerns that 
WTO rules were circumvented (or at least, loopholes and weaknesses exploited) rather than strictly 
adhered to. This matter will require further attention, with the proper specification of counterfactuals 
in frameworks that allow for the substitution between discriminatory policy instruments.  
 
At a minimum two implications for policymaking follow. Given the cumulative damage done 
to the world economy from crisis-era protectionism, if the world economy continues to recover the 
national policymakers should not only resist any temptations for future protectionism but also start to 
unwind  those  discriminatory  measures  in  place.  Both  national  ministries  and  international 
organizations, such as the WTO, could identify the most harmful crisis-era interventions and start 
talks on how such measures can be withdrawn. The list of “jumbo” measures identified by GTA and 
those affecting Chinese commerce identified here could be a starting point for such discussions. In 
addition, the WTO and other international organizations should assist small and poor countries to 
obtain, where possible, exemptions from discrimination of their trading partners.  
 
In the middle to longer run, governments leaders should rethink the role of the WTO in the 
light of contemporary experience. If a consensus emerges that current multilateral trade rules were 
not strong enough to resist from protectionist temptations during the global economic crisis, then 
policymakers  may  wish  to  initiate  negotiations  on  new  rules  on  subsidies,  public  procurement, 
export  taxes  and  incentives,  and  the  other  measures  used  frequently  in  recent  years.  Such 
negotiations  would  go  well  beyond  the  Doha  Round  mandate  and  it  is  an  open  question  as  to 
whether that mandate--if unmodified--best serves the interests of the world trading system.    5 
1. Introduction 
 
Policymakers and academics around the globe have been concerned about the threat of rising 
protectionism during the recent Global Financial Crisis and its aftermath. The G20 Heads of State 
and Government pledged to eschew protectionism in earlier summit meetings, at latter meetings they 
pledged to fight protectionism.  In the Declaration of the summit in Toronto in June 2010, G20 
leaders praised themselves for having chosen “to keep markets open to the opportunities that trade 
and investment offer.” Also, they renewed the pledge “to refrain from raising barriers or imposing 
new barriers to investment or trade in goods and services” (G20, 2010). On the face of it, these 
statements are supported by the joint report of the WTO, OECD, and UNCTAD, dated 14 June 2010, 
which served as background information for the G20 talks in Toronto (WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 
2010). In particular, the WTO estimated that new “import restricting measures” introduced since 
November 2009 covered only 0.4 percent of total world imports (WTO, 2010). 
 
In contrast to this optimistic perspective, certain trade experts warned early in the crisis that 
this time around, in contrast to the Great Depression in the 1930s, protectionism is likely to be 
“murky” (Baldwin and Evenett, 2009). Murky protectionism need not involve a direct violation of 
WTO obligation, but represents an abuse of the legitimate discretion given to state to discriminate 
against  foreign  goods,  companies,  workers  and  investors.  Examples  include  clauses  in  stimulus 
packages that confine spending to domestic producers (“buy local” provisions); “green” policies that 
subsidize the manufacturing of environmental  friendly  goods but again  only for local producers 
(Evenett  and  Whalley,  2009;  Aggarwal  and  Evenett  2010);  or  the  bailout  packages  for  selected 
domestic  firms  in  tradeable  sectors,  which  effectively  alter  the  conditions  of  competition  and 
international  commerce.  Interestingly,  the  WTO-OECD-UNCTAD  report  also  admits  that  such 
policy measures may be more significant in terms of their potential impact on trade, investment and 
competition than the traditional trade and investment restrictions (WTO-OECD-UNCTAD, 2010). 
However, the latter report makes no attempt to compare the magnitude of trade affected by murkier 
forms of protection with the easier-to-measure tariffs and trade defense instruments.  
 
The latest results from the Global Trade Alert (GTA), an independent monitoring initiative 
providing  information  of  state  measures  (including  “murky”  measures)  that  are  likely  to  affect 
foreign commerce, show little let up in the number of discriminatory measures being implemented 
since the G20 summit in September 2009 (Evenett, 2010). Worldwide, governments have imposed 
357  state  measures  that  discriminate  against  foreign  commercial  interests  since  the  Pittsburgh 
summit. The total number of crisis-era discrimination measures almost trebled to 554. Moreover 
Evenett and  Fritz (2010) used a  conservative methodology to identify 16 (out of the 554) state 
measures from the GTA database that are likely to adversely affect both a large number of trading 
partners and a sizeable amount of international trade. The total estimate of trade covered by these 
“jumbo” measures is at least 10 percent of the total value of world imports in 2008.  
 
One might ask why the conclusions of the WTO and the GTA are so different. Does the 
omission of the “murkier” forms of state discrimination against foreign commercial interests in the 
WTOs  calculations  bias  downwards  their  estimates  of  the  trade  affected  by  contemporary 
protectionism? Ultimately, is the issue what forms of state discrimination legitimately fall within the 
purview of any monitoring exercise? Section 2 provides compares the methods used by the WTO 
and the GTA for their estimates of trade coverage of crisis-era protectionism. Section 3 gives a 
snapshot  of  the  current  level  of  protectionism  and  the  protectionism  that  is  in  the  pipeline.  In 
particular,  it  identifies  which  forms  of  discrimination  are  the  most  prevalent  forms  of  crisis-era 
protectionism.  
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The remainder of the paper focuses on the Asia and Pacific region and assesses whether 
contemporary protectionism in this region is similar to general tendencies (Section 4). In Section 5 
special  focus  is  given  to  China,  which  is  found  by  the  GTA  to  be  the  most  frequently  hurt 
jurisdiction  by  other  nations'  protectionist  measures.  Estimates  are  provided  of  the  amount  of 
Chinese  exports  affected  by  certain  foreign  crisis-era  measures;  the  first  time  the  impact  on  an 
Asian-Pacific nation's total exports have been calculated. Section 6 concludes and discusses the 
implications for policymaking. 
 
This paper uses extensively the GTA database, which at the time of writing (July 2010) 
consisted of 1052 investigations of state measures that had been announced or implemented since 
November 2008. The publicly available dataset goes beyond its competitors in terms of coverage of 
countries, policy instruments, and other information such the identification of trading partners likely 
to be harmed by a specific measure. Details about the construction of this dataset can be found in 
Evenett (2009). 
 
2. Comparison of WTO and GTA
1 estimates for trade coverage of 
crisis-era protectionism 
It is a challenge to provide a precise estimate of the total value of world trade covered by 
protectionist  measures  implemented  during  the  global  economic  downturn  and  thereafter.  Still, 
recent reports by the WTO and the GTA have attempted to shed light on this matter. The WTO 
report takes into consideration only those import restricting measures implemented during previous 
six months and estimates that 0.44% of world trade is affected by protectionism
2. The WTO report 
notes that strictly speaking this estimate may be too high, for the WTO uses HS 6-digit data to make 
its calculations when in fact the measures are targeted at the 8-digit level (WTO, 2010, p. 16). In 
contrast, researchers associated with the GTA have estimated that US$1.6 trillion of world trade, 
equivalent to more than 10 percent of world imports in 2010, provides a minimum level of the trade 
affected by crisis-era protectionism. The authors in question contend their estimate is "conservative," 




Why are the reported coverage ratios so different? Firstly, the WTO estimate includes only 
standard trade policy instruments, principally trade defense measures. The most often used of these 
measures are designed so that they can target not just specific nations that export a good, but certain 
exporting firms without those nations. While safeguard measures affect imports of a good from all 
foreign sources, unless the good and importer in question are significant in size the magnitude of 
trade affected will almost certainly pale compared to the totals from world trade. It is therefore not 
surprising that the total amount of trade affected by trade defense measures in a given six month 
period is small
4. Similar findings are already well established in the literature on antidumping, for 
                                                           
1 In this section, the GTA estimate corresponds to the calculations of Evenett and Fritz (2010), who are both members of 
the GTA team.  
2 This is the estimate for import-restricting measures implemented since November 2009. If measures between October 
2008 and October 2009 are added, the comparable estimate of world trade affected is 1.41 percent. 
3 See Evenett and Fritz (2010) for more details.  
4 This statement is almost certainly the case irrespective of any undercounting by the WTO secretariat. Potential 
undercounting cannot be ruled out in the measures listed in the WTO reports, not least because the WTO secretariat is in 
many cases reliant on its member governments to honestly report in short order the measures taken against foreign 
commercial interests. Overcounting is unlikely in the WTO reports because the same member governments would 
quickly point out any errors made. The bias is on reporting less protectionism than has actually occurred, a point readers 
should bear in mind when interpreting the press statements and speeches that accompany the publication of WTO 
reports.   7 
example
5. Short of an explosion of trade defense measures being introduced, computing the total 
amount of trade affected by such interventions is tantamount to trawling for minnows. To continue 
the metaphor, the real question is whether there are any bigger fish in the (protectionist) sea? 
 
If the scope of regional trade negotiations and the Doha Round are any guide, and if the 
specifics of bilateral trade disputes since the 1980s offers any clues, for best part of three decades 
trade  diplomats,  trade  ministers,  and  trade  analysts  have  recognized  that  states  can  discriminate 
against  foreign  commercial  interests  in  many  ways.  The  chapters  of  any  recent  regional  trade 
agreement signed by the United States, or for that matter any industrialized country, indicate that 
discrimination is possible far beyond the application of tariffs and trade measures. So as to provide 
as complete a picture of the contemporary realities of protectionism, the GTA is prepared to include 




Rather than restricting the analysis to traditional instruments, GTA used objective criteria to 
identify so-called “jumbo discriminatory measures”, which are likely to affect a large number of 
trading partners and a sizable amount of trade (more than US$10 billion). The 16 “jumbo” measures 
that  were  used  for  the  estimate  include  bailouts,  export  subsidies  and  competitive  devaluations 
among other less traditional beggar-thy-neighbor policies. Together, these measures concern half of 
the estimated US$ 1.6 trillion. The other half is harmed by more traditional policies, in particular 
export restrictions and tariff measures.  
 
A second aspect that may contribute to the different results is GTA’s use of a lower level of 
disaggregation to identify the affected tariff lines compared to the WTO (HS 4-digits versus HS 6-
digits). Surely it is more precise and therefore preferable to look at specific products rather than 
using the broad HS 4-digit category
7, which will overestimate the trade coverage since they will 
include some products not actually affected by a measure? It is important to remember that many of 
the non-tariff measures are implemented by levels of government that do not identify the products 
affected using the standard HS classification. Any attempt at classification at the 8-digit level could 
(given the broad definitions of the product scope of many discriminatory policies) be arbitrary and 
undercount  the  amount  of  trade  affected.  For  trade  policy  instruments  where  higher  levels  of 
disaggregation are publicly reported, then going beyond the 4-digit level may yield more precise 
estimates. But readers should be under no illusion that such information is available for all of the 
murkier, less transparent forms of protectionism.  
 
Even though the right choice of disaggregation matters along with other steps in the proper 
calculation of trade affected
8, the biggest difference between the two sets of estimates almost surely 
rests on the choice of policy instruments included. It may be the case that the historical resort to 
import-reducing  measures  in  the  1930s  provides  a  rationale  for  considering  the  impact  of  those 
measures now. However, it is difficult to see how that argument justifies ignoring other relevant 
discriminatory policy instruments. In short, if the forms of protectionism have evolved over time, so 
should trade policy monitoring exercises and the associated trade coverage calculations. For sure, 
measurement may not be perfect but rough orders of magnitude are probably what is needed for 
                                                           
5 More interesting is that the use (rather than the amount) of such measures may has changed during the crisis. See Bown 
(2010) and Fritz and Wermelinger (2009) for details. 
6 The use of the word "alters" is deliberate in this last sentence. Therefore, the GTA database also records liberalising 
measures that eliminate or narrow discrimination against foreign commercial interests. 
7 Some sense of perspective is needed here. Even at the 4-digit level there are over 1200 different types of product. 
Readers are encouraged to look over the 4-digit HS classification to see how fine grained it actually is.  
8 The computational steps in Evenett and Fritz (2010) almost certainly result in underestimates of the total amount of 
trade affected, for reasons given therein.   8 
policymaking. Still, reports should specify what steps were taken in making calculations
9, so that 
others can replicate their methodologies
10. 
3. Snapshot of contemporary resort to protectionism 
The purpose of this section is to provide an overview of protectionist measures that have 
been announced or implemented after the first crisis-related G20 summit in November 2008. The 
prevalence of “behind the border” non-tariff measures that potentially affect foreign commercial 
interests--not just imports--is highlighted.  
 
3.1 Protectionism remains an issue of concern
11 
 
Given that the G20 leaders repeatedly pledged to eschew protectionism, the opportunity is 
taken here to assess what happened between the G20 summits in September 2009 and June 2010. 
Worldwide, governments have implemented 357 state measures that discriminate against foreign 
commercial  interests,  almost  trebling  the  amount  of  observed  discrimination  (to  554  measures). 
Measures that harm commercial interests of its trading partners outnumber beneficial measures four 
to one, although it should be remembered that each measure may differ in scope and impact. The 
G20  governments  are  responsible  for  over  60  percent  of  all  the  discriminatory  measures 
implemented worldwide. It should also be noted that 80 percent of the trade liberalizing measures 
implemented during the last eight months were introduced by G20 government.  
 
These discriminatory measures hurt others. In fact, as shown in Table 1, many of the G20 
members have suffered a substantial number of hits on their commercial interests. For example, 
China has suffered 282 hits to its commercial interest abroad (an increase of nearly 100 since the 
G20 in September last year). The question arises why governments (in particular large and powerful 
ones) continue to accept the damage to their commercial interests, especially when there is a lot of 
variation across countries in harm inflicted.  
 
Another puzzling factor in the limited dissension among large nations is the recognition that 
some  countries  inflict  harm  far  more  often  than  others.  Four  indicators  of  the  harm  done  by  a 
nation’s discriminatory policies are reported and The top 10 worst offenders on each metric are 
listed in Table 2. From the Asia and Pacific region China, India, Indonesia, Kazakhstan and the 
Russian Federation recur on the list (see Section 4 of this paper for a closer look at this region). The 
EU27 refers to the combined impact of all the actions taken by the European Commission and the 27 
member states. Together, the EU27 appear as the top 5 worst offenders on all four metrics, a dubious 
distinction. However, most of the harm done by the EU27 grouping results from measures taken by 









                                                           
9 To its credit, the most recent WTO report was transparent in this respect.  
10 To that end, Evenett and Fritz have made the relevant data and spreadsheets associated with their trade coverage 
calculations available to those who have asked for them.  
11 Some of the results presented in this sub-section are also published in “Unequal Compliance: The 6
th GTA report", see 
Evenett (2010).    9 
Table 1: Since the Pittsburgh G-20 summit many countries have seen their commercial 












China 282 183 125 48
EU27 266 na 80 na
United States 213 127 46 27
Germany 204 20 56 26
France 188 110 46 22
United Kingdom 181 109 44 24
Italy 175 105 50 27
Belgium 70 92 42 21
Japan 168 90 47 24
Netherlands 163 92 42 24
Number of discriminatory measures 
imposed on target
Number of pending mesures, which if 
implemented, would harm target
Top 10 targets
 
Notes: This table is also published in “Unequal Compliance: The 6
th GTA report” edited by Evenett (2010). 
 
Table 2: Some jurisdictions inflict more harm than others 
 




Ranked by the 
number of tariff lines 
(product categories) 




Ranked by the 
number of sectors 




Ranked by the 
number of trading 




1 EU27 (146) Venezuela (784) EU27 (55) EU27 (168)
2 Russian Fed. (73) Kazakhstan (719) Algeria (54) Argentina (161)
3 Argentina (41) Nigeria (5999 Nigeria (45) China (161)
4 India (31) EU27 (437) Venezuela (38) Indonesia (152)
5 Germany (29) Russian Fed. (421) Kazakhstan (36) Russian Fed. (142)
6 United Kingdom (24) Russian Fed. (34)
7 Indonesia (22) Ethiopia (32)
8 Ethiopia (345) Indonesia (32)
9 Argentina (336) India (31)
10 Austria (17) China (335) Germany (27)
Rank




Metric, country is specified rank, number
 
Notes: This table is also published in “Unequal Compliance: The 6
th GTA report” edited by Evenett (2010). The EU27   
refers to the combined impact of all the actions taken by the European Commission and the 27 member states. 
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It is also important to check whether the protectionist momentum has abated as the world 
economy  appears  to  recover.  Figure  1  plots  the  number  of  harmful  measures  implemented  per 
quarter since November 2008. At first cut this plot shows a slowdown in use of discriminatory state 
actions.  However,  as  Evenett  (2010)  argues,  many  interventions  become  apparent  several 
(sometimes  up  to  12)  months  after  the  actual  implementation.  Therefore,  the  decline  over  time 
reflects reporting challenges rather than improved government behavior. Comparisons across the 
GTA reports over time has shown that in most quarters the totals quickly converge to a range of 100-
125  protectionist  measures  implemented  per  quarter.  No  departure  from  this  pattern  has  been 
observed, suggesting that the recovery has yet to limit the resort to protectionism. Moreover, much 
of the discrimination put in place has yet to be removed while more than 200 measures have been 
announced and may be implemented in the months ahead. So as far as open markets are concerned, 
the current situation does not afford much room for complacency.  
 
Figure 1: Less harmful state actions are recorded in each quarter,  
but this is an artifact of reporting lags  
 
   11 
3.2 Non-tariff measures (behind the border) are the most prevalent 
 
The  introduction  of  this  paper  alluded  to  the  importance  of  less  transparent  protectionist 
measures--the  so-called  murky  protectionism--during  the  recent  global  economic  crisis.  In 
introducing this subject, it is necessary to set to one side certain unpersuasive arguments for not 
reporting certain discriminatory measures against foreign commercial interests. For instance, it is 
well known that the deep financial crisis induced many governments to bail-out troubled banks and 
other financial intermediaries. Far too many policymakers and trade diplomats have appeared to 
argue that the systemic nature of the threat to the financial system trumps all other considerations.  
 
Here it is important to distinguish between two features of such bail-outs: their apparent 
systemic importance and any discriminatory nature. This distinction is important because it begs the 
question of whether it was necessary to introduce discriminatory bail-outs to preserve the financial 
system.  It  may  be  possible--indeed  arguably  it  is  preferable--to  introduce  bailouts  that  helped 
preserve the stability of the financial system which do not discriminate against foreign commercial 
interests. If so, a country can be faithful to its commitments to trading partners and still be able to 
tackle financial crises. Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, there is no accepted proposition 
that discrimination is a pre-requisite for effectiveness (assessed at the national or global level.) It is 
quite probable that, had a greater set of alternatives been contemplated, that less discriminatory or 
non-discriminatory  financial  support  packages  could  have  been  identified  that  were  equally 
effective. 
  
When one examines the evidence, however, what is astonishing is that a lot of the reported 
crisis-era state aids were not provided to the financial sector, but to other industries in trouble where 
the "systemic threat" argument hardly applies. For example, 60 percent of all bailout / state aid 
measures implemented between November 2008 and June 2009 that were recorded in the Global 
Trade Alert database were provided to non-financial sectors. Moreover, one would expect that the 
“bailout season” to be over with the apparent recovery from the crisis. However, no signs of such a 
slowdown can be found in the data; these measures remain the most often used discriminatory policy 
tool, followed by trade defense actions.  
 
Figure 2 draws the quarter-by-quarter picture for different  groups of  measure types. The 
share of behind the border measures
12, which tend to be less tightly regulated by WTO accords, 
remains around 40 percent - a proportion that is fairly constant since the beginning of 2009. By 
contrast,  the  share  of  traditional  tariff-related  measures,  in  particular  trade  defense  measures, 
actually falls from a 40% peak in the 3
rd quarter of 2009 to 25% in the 2
nd quarter of 2010. Including 
other forms of discrimination, such as migration and investment measures or export restrictions to 
list,  the  prevalence  of  non-tariff  interventions  becomes  all  the  more  apparent  in  the  set  of 
implemented stated measures. Having said this, tariff and trade defense measures still dominate the 
measures that have been announced but not yet implemented.
13 In short, it is important to distinguish 
between measures that have been taken and those that have been announced and could be taken for 
their composition varies. 
 
 
                                                           
12 Including consumption subsidies, local content requirements, public procurement measures, bailout / state aid 
measures, export subsidies and trade finance support 
13 To save space, the sectoral analysis of government intervention is not presented here. Evenett and Aggarwal (2009, 
2010) provide some evidence and hypotheses as to how the sectoral incidence and form of state action have changed 
during the global economic crisis.   12 
Figure 2: How has contemporary protectionism changed quarter-by-quarter? 
 
Notes: Tariff-relates measures include tariff and trade defense measures. NTM at the border include quotas, import bans, 
TBT, non tariff barriers (not otherwise specified). NTM behind the border include consumption subsidies, local content 
requirements, public procurement, bailout / state aid measures, export subsidies, trade finance support, support to state 
trading enterprises and state-controlled companies. Others include investment, migration, intellectual property protection 
and other service sector measures.  
 
4. Is protectionism in the Asia and the Pacific region at par with 
global tendencies? 
 
This  section  explores  whether  discrimination  against  and  harm  inflicted  by  emerging  or 




4.1 Harm done to Asian-Pacific commercial interests 
 
China is the only jurisdiction in the Asia and the Pacific region on the list of jurisdictions 
whose foreign commercial interests are harmed the most (see Table 1 above). The second most 
affected in this region, the Republic of Korea, has been hit almost half the time that China has. Table 






                                                           
14 A more in depth analysis of the protectionist landscape in the Asia and the Pacific region is provided in Mikic (2009).    13 




measures imposed on 
target









Bail out / state aid 
(61)













Thailand 141 Russian Fed. 
(27)











(36) Argentina (9) France (8)




Export tax or 
restriction (19)
India 131 Russian Fed. 
(20)





Singapore 109 Russian Fed. 
(18)
































(12) Argentina (10) India (9)






Russian Federation 93 Argentina (10) China (8) Kazakhstan (7)




Export tax or 
restriction (14)
Trading partners imposing largest number of 
discriminatory measures on target Type of measure imposed most frequently on target
 
4.2 Some of the worst offenders can be found in the Asia-Pacific region 
 
Study of Table 3 reveals that many of the countries responsible for the many of the measures 
harming  Asian-Pacific  are  from  within  the  region.  The  Russian  Federation  and  Indonesia,  in 
particular, feature prominently. At the global scale, Russian Federation and Indonesia along with 
India, China and Kazakhstan also belong to the world’s leading protectionist players (see Table 2 
above). Taken together these countries are also responsible for 15 of the 22 “jumbo discriminatory 
measures”
15. It is also interesting that there is a symmetry between the measures inflicting harm on 
the Asia-Pacific and the ones imposed by the region (see Figure 3). The comparison to the global 
distribution shows that tariff increases and trade defense measures are more prevalent in the Asia-
Pacific region. By contrast, behind the border measures make up a smaller (but still considerable) 








                                                           
15 Identified by Evenett and Fritz (2010). It has to be noted that 22 jumbo measures were identified, but only 16 of them 
were used for the estimate of total trade coverage (see Section 2).    14 
Figure 3: Compared to the world average, the Asia-Pacific region resorts to tariff related 
measures more often 
 
Notes: Tariff-relates measures include tariff and trade defense measures. NTM at the border include quotas, import bans, 
TBT, non tariff barriers (not otherwise specified). NTM behind the border include consumption subsidies, local content 
requirements, public procurement, bailout / state aid measures, export subsidies, trade finance support, support to state 
trading enterprises and state-controlled companies. Others include investment, migration, intellectual property protection 
and other service sector measures.  
4.3 Harm to the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
 
Is  the  treatment  of  the  LDCs  different?  As  mentioned  in  Mikic  (2009),  the  international 
community  has  declared  repeatedly  that  the  Least  Developed  Countries  in  the  world  should  be 
assisted  in  their  efforts  to  integrate  into  the  global  economy.  Traditionally,  they  have  access  to 
special and differential treatment through the multilateral trading rules. In addition, they have been 
given special focus in the Millennium Development Goals through the adoption of Goal 8, which is 
focused on developing global partnerships. The Asia-Pacific region is host of 14 out of 49 least 
developed  countries.  Despite  the  considerations  above,  these  countries  have  been  the  target  of 
discriminatory interventions during the crisis-era, while none of them so far has implemented any 
measure (see Table 4). Trading partners that have imposed most of these measures are India, whose 
interventions have harmed seven LDCs at least twice. Likewise, Indonesia's measures have harmed 8 
LDCs.  Most  of  the  measures  that  are  thought  likely  to  have  harmed  poor  countries  are  export 
restrictions and bailouts. Given their vulnerabilities, more detailed analysis of the amount of harm 
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measures imposed on 
target
No 1 No 2 No 3 No 1 No 2 No 3
Bangladesh 37 India (8) Argentina (5) Indonesia (3)
Bail out / state aid 
measure (12)
Export tax or 
restriction (10)
Migriation (6)
Afghanistan 18 India (4)
Argentina, Russian 
Fed. (2)
Export tax or 
restriction (6)
Bail out / state aid 
measure, Export 
subsidy (5)
Cambodia 15 India (4)
Argentina, Indonesia 
(2)
Export tax or 
restriction (5)
Bail out / state aid 
measure, Export 
subsidy (4)
Myanmar 15 Indonesia (4) India (3)
China, Rep. of Korea 
(2)
Export tax or 
restriction (6)
Tariff measure (5)
Export subsidy, NTB 
(3)





Export taxes or 
restriction (4)


















Export tax or 
restriction (4)
Bail out / state aid 
measure (3) Tariff measure (2)
Samoa 5 Indonesia (2)
Belarus, Nigeria, Rep. 
of Korea, Russian 
Fed. (1)
Bail out / state aid 
measure (2)
Export tax or 
restriction (2)
Import subsidy (1)
Maldives  4 India (2) Indonesia, Japan (1)
Export subsidy, Trade 
finance (2)





Bail out / state aid 





Bail out / state aid 
measure, Export tax 
or restriction, Import 
subsidy (1)
Timor-Leste 3 Indonesia (3) Export tax or 
restriction (2)
Tariff measure (1)
Bhutan 2 India (2)
NTB, Tariff measure 
(1)
Kiribati 1 Japan (1) NTB (1)
Tuvalu 0
Trading partners imposing largest number of discriminatory 
measures on target
Type of measure imposed most frequently on target
 
5. How is China’s trade affected by contemporary protectionism? 
Mention has already been made that China's commercial interests have been hit the most 
often by foreign discriminatory measures
16. Out of the 1052 measures investigated by the GTA, 533 
measures  affect  Chinese  exports.  More  than  half  of  these,  namely  282,  are  “almost  certainly” 
discriminatory against China’s commercial interests; another 126 measures are announced or under 
consideration and would (if implemented) involve discrimination. Only 75 (out of 533) measures 
against China are benign or beneficial to its commercial interests. This section investigates how 
much of China’s exports and imports are affected by foreign discriminatory measures and whether it 





                                                           
16 Applying different metrics (such as number of discriminatory measures affecting specific trading partner, number of 
pending measures likely to affect trading partner, or number of jurisdictions imposing discriminatory measures against 
trading partner) China is always the top offended nation.  
17A similar investigation is done for the case of Switzerland in Wermelinger (2010). Notice that the focus here on exports 
and imports reveals nothing about the harm done by foreign protectionism to Chinese migrants and foreign investments. 
For this reason, and others, the value of Chinese commercial interests affected by foreign protectionism will be larger 
than the numbers reported in this section.    16 
5.1 A conservative method to identify measures that affect China’s trade 
 
The first step is to identify the foreign measures that harm Chinese trade. What follows is a 
conservative methodology that almost surely underestimates the set of relevant measures. The first 
step  amounts  to  identifying  those  foreign  measures  in  the  GTA  database  meeting  the  following 
conditions
18: 
a)  The measure is classified “red” in the Global Trade Alert dataset; that is, the measure “almost 
certainly” discriminates against foreign commercial interests and has been implemented.  
b)  The measure is still implemented in June 2010 (when the computations for this paper were 
undertaken.)  
c)  In 2008 the measure would have covered more than a de minimus amount of goods trade with 
China (taken to be US $1 million). 
d)  The  measure  is  not  a  subsidy  or  bailout  to  the  financial  sector,  and  not  an  investment, 
migration or service sector measure.  
e)  If  the  measure  is  a  subsidy  or  bailout  to  a  non-financial  sector  (including  trade  finance 
support), then the total value of the outlay by the implementing government was at least US 
$1 billion; or (in case the value of the total outlay is not available) in 2008 the measure would 
have covered at least US $10 billion in international trade.  
f)  If  the  measure  is  a  subsidy  or  bailout  to  a  non-financial  sector  (including  trade  finance 
support), then in 2008 the implementing jurisdiction’s average share of world exports in the 
product lines affected exceeded five percent.  
 
The above criteria make sure that measures included in the subsequent calculations have 
almost certainly affected Chinese trade above de minimus levels. Specifically, the requirements e) 
and f), which concern measures that affect China’s exporting interests through their influence of 
world prices of the products in question, restricts attention to measures likely to have affected world 
prices.  
 
The above procedure identified 164 (out of the 282) state measures. Next, account is taken of the 
fact  that  different  types  of  measure  are  likely  to  affect  different  types  of  Chinese  imports  and 
exports. Specifically, it is assumed (consistent with the GTA’s methodology in identifying affected 
trading partners and tariff lines) that:  
a)  China’s  exports  of  a  particular  product  are  directly  affected  (i.e.  China’s  exports  to  the 
implementing  jurisdiction  in  the  tariff  lines  concerned)  by  foreign  tariff  increases,  trade 
defense measures, quotas, import bans, technical barriers to trade, non-tariff barriers (not 
otherwise specified), consumption subsidies, local content requirements, public procurement, 
and competitive devaluations affecting the same product. 
b)  China’s exports of a particular product are indirectly affected (i.e. China’s exports to the 
world in the tariff lines concerned) by foreign bailout/state aid measures (to non-financial 
sectors) and export subsidies affecting the same product. 
c)  China’s  imports  of  a  product  are  affected  (i.e.  China’s  imports  from  the  implementing 
jurisdiction  in  the  tariff  lines  concerned)  by  foreign  export  taxes  or  restriction  and 
competitive devaluations affecting the same product. 
 
 
                                                           
18 For stated reasons in Section 2, the methodology applied here is motivated by Evenett and Fritz (2010).    17 
5.2 A significant amount of Chinese trade is affected by foreign measures; behind the 
border measures account for most of trade covered 
 
Not  surprisingly,  the  amount  of  trade  harmed  by  the  large  number  of  measures  that 
discriminate  against  China’s  commercial  interests  is  substantial.  Table  5  shows  that  almost  10 
percent of total Chinese exports are covered, and that most of the harm is done by interventions that 
affect  China’s  exports  directly.  Two  points  of  interpretation  should  be  made:  first,  the  bigger 
estimate (for directly affected exports) is also the more precise as the measures involved indeed 
directly hinder the concerned exports. Second, the smaller estimate (for indirectly affected exports) 
is  calculated  with  the  conservative  methodology  described  above.  Table  6  shows  that  the  three 
biggest measures
19 in terms of potentially affected Chinese exports (that meet all but one of the 
above criteria) are excluded in the estimate. The implementing jurisdiction’s share of world exports 
in the product lines affected by these measures is below 5 percent and is less likely to distort world 
prices of these products. This approach is rather restrictive and a marginally more liberal method 
would increase the share of export coverage dramatically. The situation is less of a concern for 
imports. China’s trading partners harm US$ 45 billion or 4 percent of total Chinese imports with 
export restrictions and competitive devaluation measures.  
 
The analysis confirms that the most often harmed jurisdiction in the GTA database is also 
considerably affected in terms of trade covered by the measures. It would be interesting to study how 
the number of measures that harm a jurisdiction (or the total trade of this jurisdiction) correlates with 
the share of total trade affected by these measures. If the correlations are different from zero, it 
would show that traders are not symmetrically harmed in terms of trade covered
20.  
 
It is also interesting to know which foreign jurisdictions' measures adversely affect the most 
of China's trade. Four different indicators of harm inflicted by China’s partners are calculated; three 
of which take account of trade coverage. Table 7 reports the 10 worst offenders against China’s 
bilateral (direct) exports on each metric. Indonesia, the Russian Federation, and the United States 
appear in the top-3 worst offenders for two of the indicators, respectively. All of them are also 
identified as big global offenders with respect to “jumbo” measures implemented
21.  
 
Additional analysis of the China evidence also confirms previous findings. Although tariff 
increases and trade defense measures are most frequently measures to harm China’s commercial 
interests (namely, 90 measures, amounting to more than half of all those measures used to calculate 
the conservative estimate), it is the less-transparent “behind the border” measures that affect greater 
total amounts of Chinese trade. Table 8 presents a detailed list for number of measures and share of 
trade  value  affected  by  each  measure  type;  only  12  percent  of  the  trade  covered  by  foreign 
protectionist  measures  are  associated  with  tariff  increases  and  the  application  of  trade  defense 
measures. Figure 4 illustrates the same information at a less disaggregated level. 
 
 
                                                           
19 Incidentally, all classified as “jumbo” by Evenett and Fritz (2010). 
20 This exercise goes beyond the purpose of this paper, but some anecdotal evidence for the existence of symmetric 
export coverage is available; the export coverage for Switzerland is around 10 percent; similar to the China case. It has 
however to be noted that the 10 percent are mainly driven by the broad export tax rebate the Chinese government granted 
in 2009 (Wermelinger, 2010). This measure alone (indirectly) affects 9 percent of total Swiss exports. 
21 It should be noted that China itself has implemented the “jumbo” measure covering most trade worldwide.    18 
Table 5: How much of China's trade is affected by discriminatory measures? 
Trade value (in 2008  US$ bn)  
of potentially affected 
Chinese imports
Share of potentially affected 
imports in total Chinese 
imports
directly indirectly total directly indirectly total total total
124.39 18.12 142.51 8.69% 1.27% 9.96% 45.00 3.98%
Trade value (in 2008, US$ bn)  of potentially 
affected Chinese exports




Table 6: List of discriminatory measures that indirectly affected Chinese exports 
Implementing 
juristiction












of world exports in 
the product lines 
affected
Chinese share of 
world exports in 
the product lines 
affected
Trade value (in 2008, 
US$ bn)  of potentially 
affected Chinese 
exports
Share of potentially 











Extension of tax exemptions for locally produced 
capital goods
Bail out / state 
aid measure
192 16.96% 0.18% 12.92% 690.17 48.24% yes no
Brazil New credit line for exports of consumer goods Trade finance 196 17.31% 1.21% 16.65% 636.68 44.50% yes no
United Kingdom
UK: Temporary aid for the production of green 
products
Bail out / state 
aid measure
119 10.51% 3.66% 8.09% 211.57 14.79% yes no




France: Immediate EUR 1.65 billion rescue package 
for French farmers
 Bail out / state 
aid measure
United States Support for General Motors and Chrysler. Bail out / state 
aid measure
3 0.27% 8.41% 1.02% 7.79 0.54% no yes
Germany Organic Farming - R&D&I scheme Bail out / state 
aid measure
1 0.09% 22.15% 1.87% 1.06 0.07% no yes
Measures to "stabilise" markets for certain dairy 
products
Reintroduction of export refunds for milk and milk 
products, butter and butteroil
0.04% European Union 9 64.69% 0.80% 0.86% 0.62
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Table 7: Ranking of trading partners in terms of direct harm to their bilateral exports 
to China, 4 different metrics 
 
Ranking
Share of affected exports as 
% of China's exports to the 
world in the targeted 4-digit 
product lines
Share of affected exports 
as % of China' s total 
exports to that 
implementing juristiction
Trade value (in 2008, 
billion USD) of affected 
exports
Number of product lines 
affected
1 19.63% 100.00% 82.41 212
Japan Ethiopia United States Indonesia
2 17.16% 100.00% 11.76 166
Rep. of Korea Kazakhstan Indonesia Russian Federation
3 16.13% 100.00% 7.04 139
USA Nigeria Russian Federation Nigeria
4 12.24% 100.00% 5.64 106
European Union Venezuela Japan Ethiopia
5 4.02% 68.40% 3.55 107
Mongolia Indonesia European Union United States
6 3.35% 32.59% 3.18 93
Viet Nam USA India Kazakhstan
7 2.71% 29.20% 1.48 83
Canada Argentina Argentina Argentina
8 2.37% 21.27% 1.29 71
Customs Union (RBK) Russian Federation Iran Japan
9 1.90% 10.05% 1.12 66
Russian Federation India Ethiopia Venezuela
10 1.81% 8.41% 1.11 38
Thailand Paraguay Viet Nam Islamic Rep. of Iran
 
 
























































































































































































































































































measures 39 51 3 13 3 13 4 5 6 4 3 16
Trade flow 
affected
Share of trade 





























































Notes: The figures concern only the measures used for the calculations below; in particular only 164 of the 282 
discriminatory measures are used.    20 
Figure 4: Share of different types of measures that affect China’s trade, weighted by 
trade covered 
 
Notes: Tariff-relates measures include tariff and trade defense measures. NTM at the border include quotas, 
import bans, TBT, non tariff barriers (not otherwise specified). NTM behind the border include consumption 
subsidies, local content requirements, public procurement, bailout / state aid measures, export subsidies, trade 
finance support, support to state trading enterprises and state-controlled companies. Others include investment, 
migration, intellectual property protection and other service sector measures.  
 
6. Conclusions and implications for policymaking 
Making extensive use of the GTA database the purpose of this paper was to provide a 
snapshot of current protectionist dynamics. Two methods of estimating the trade covered by 
crisis-era protectionism were also examined. Although the method used in recent WTO report 
may  use  a  more  appropriate  level  of  tariff  line  disaggregation  for  some  discriminatory 
measures, overall, it was argued that GTA's estimates provide a better estimate of the amount 
of global commerce affected by global era protectionism.  
 
This paper also confirmed the contemporary importance of “murky” protectionism. 
The overview of the crisis-era protectionist landscape showed that in each quarter of the past 
18 months more than half of discriminatory measures are not tariffs or trade defense measures 
and tend to fall under weaker or no WTO rules. The harm inflicted by and the discrimination 
against the Asia-Pacific region is rather similar to global tendencies; although tariff-related 
measures are slightly more prevalent in this region. For the jurisdiction harmed by the greatest 
number of foreign discriminatory measures, China, it is shown that at least 10 percent of its 
exports are harmed and more than 50 percent of which are affected by “murky” forms of 
protectionism, notably,  local content requirements and bailouts.  
 
In interpreting the performance of WTO rules, the evidence presented raises further 
questions. Some heart might be taken from the fact that governments have not chosen to raise 
tariffs above bound rates. However, the widespread resort to subsidies and bail outs raises 
concerns that WTO rules were circumvented (or at least, loopholes and weaknesses exploited) 
rather  than  strictly  adhered  to.  This  matter  will  require  further  attention,  with  the  proper 
specification  of  counterfactuals  in  frameworks  that  allow  for  the  substitution  between 
discriminatory policy instruments.  
   21 
At  a  minimum  two  implications  for  policymaking  follow.  Given  the  cumulative 
damage  done  to  the  world  economy  from  crisis-era  protectionism,  if  the  world  economy 
continues to recover the national policymakers should not only resist any temptations for 
future protectionism but also start to unwind those discriminatory measures in place. Both 
national ministries and international organizations, such as the WTO, could identify the most 
harmful crisis-era interventions and start talks on how such measures can be withdrawn. The 
list of “jumbo” measures identified by Evenett and Fritz (2010) and those affecting Chinese 
commerce identified here could be a starting point for such discussions. In addition, the WTO 
and other international organizations should assist small and poor countries to obtain, where 
possible, exemptions from discrimination of their trading partners.  
 
In the middle to longer run, governments’ leaders should rethink the role of the WTO 
in the light of contemporary experience. If a consensus emerges that current multilateral trade 
rules  were  not  strong  enough  to  resist  from  protectionist  temptations  during  the  global 
economic  crisis,  then  policymakers  may  wish  to  initiate  negotiations  on  new  rules  on 
subsidies,  public  procurement,  export  taxes  and  incentives,  and  the  other  measures  used 
frequently in recent years. Such negotiations would go well beyond the Doha Round mandate 
and it is an open question as to whether that mandate--if unmodified--best serves the interests 
of the world trading system.    22 
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